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Abstract
Transfer pricing has recently gained a prominent highlight in ASEAN countries. Eventhough transfer 
pricing policy has already been enacted by most of each ASEAN member states, there still exists 
loopholes – especially involving the transactions of cross border transfer prices. This research paper 
will discuss and further scrutinize the legal issues constituted by these loopholes, which affect both 
member states and Multi National Enterprises (“MNEs”) - particularly those associated with deficit 
tax revenue suffered by the member states, as a result of transfer pricing manipulations conducted 
by the MNEs. Transfer pricing concealed in the form of crossborder transactions; including but not 
limited to acquisitions, joint venture, and supply chains - impedes the movement of trade and capital, 
even catalyzes a tax distortion. Aside from ASEAN member states, MNEs are also being put at a 
disadvantage – to be subjected to a much greater burden on paying a higher cost of compliance, due 
to its responsibility to comply with more than one country’s jurisdiction and to have them imposed 
towards a susceptible double taxation.The result of this study encourages and essentially demonstrates 
the necessity of ASEAN to leverage a firm legal framework on transfer pricing that emphasizes on the 
manifestation of ‘arm’s length principle’ in all ASEAN countries’ jurisdictions. 
Keywords: ASEAN, transfer pricing.
I . INTRODUCTION
The globalized business world has affected the international regime 
in various aspects, mainly in the field of international trade. Nowadays, 
had the trade barrier been removed and tarriff been prohibited - the 
volumes of  international global transfer of goods and services, move-
ment of capitals, also intagible assets and services has been increasing 
tremendously. In order to catch up with the global movement, with the 
help of  rapid and expeditious advances in technology, logistics, and 
transportation - has given rise to a large number of Multi National En-
terprises (MNEs), having them possess the flexibility to expand their 
business by establishing subsidiaries and branches outside the parent’s 
company jurisdiction. The existence of such subsidiaries and branch-
es has successfully facilitated the conduct of cross-border intra-group 
transactions. Those transactions between such related parties, namely 
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an associated enterprise – enterprise that directly or indirectly control 
or being controlled in the management, control or capital,1 in which one 
party one-sidedly control the price; either determining the price lower 
than the market price and thus, shifting the profit gained to a lower 
tax jurisdiction; has caused a dissentment between both the MNEs and 
the government’s involved between the transaction, mainly its national 
tax authority.2 However, such issues should be addressed not only in a 
‘water edge’ isolation3, but towards a broad international context as a 
whole. This matter, thus, has become a prominent highlight and been 
brought up to be a huge issue to the world of international tax law, 
namely transfer pricing. These transfer prices play a huge significant 
role for MNEs and tax authoity as they determine the large part in the 
income and expenses, and thus taxable profits of those associated enter-
prises, especially in different tax jurisdiction.4
This paper helps to underline the underlying issues of transfer pric-
ing, experienced and faced by both MNEs and government on the matter 
of taxation on the business revenues. First, this paper will discuss about 
the transfer pricing conduct from MNEs and government’s perspective 
along with the legal loopholes dealt by both MNEs and government. 
Then, a brief case study along with the concrete examples of transfer 
pricing in the business world are outlined. Further, the rules applied for 
transfer pricing, as being practiced by United Nations (UN), Organisa-
tion of Economic and Development (OECD) member countries, and 
also European Union (EU) will also be reviewed. To conclude this pa-
per, an alternate solution for the transfer pricing issues in ASEAN are 
also being discussed. 
The legal loopholes and evasion caused by transfer pricing, also the 
non-existence of such binding regulations on the transfer pricing has 
piqued the interest of the author to conduct further research on this mat-
ter – also believes this paper would become a legal problem solver to 
the problems or loopholes which may arise in the near future and may 
benefit the international community as a whole. 
1  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines article 9 subparagraphs 1a and 1b
2  Lorraine Eden, ‘Taxes, Transfer Pricing, and MNEs’, Oxford University Press, 
2001. P.593; Raymond Vernon, ‘Multinational Corporations: Political Economy of 
Foreign Direct Investment, Lexington Books, 1985.
3  Eden, p. 614
4  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Preface, p. 21
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II . GROUNDS OF TRANSFER PRICING CONDUCT: IN A NUT-
SHELL
As stated above, while MNEs establish their subsidiaries and 
branches outside their parents’ company jurisdiction, it accommodates 
their needs to move their assets while also to conduct several trans-
actions, mainly from the MNE’s parent company to its subsidiary 
- so called an intrafirm transaction. Those intrafirm transactions, are 
charged on whether they are following the market prices, or reaching a 
price consensus of their own, which are usually cost based - neglecting 
the market value.5 In such situation, it become\s necessary for MNEs 
to determine the price among themselves, so called a ‘transfer price’. 
Transfer prices on such transactions are usually decided from both mar-
ket and group driven forces which may be differ from the open market 
conditions operating between the independent entities. Therefore, such 
transactions are not only controlled by market forces, however, also by 
the driven forces of the common interest of the related parties, such as 
associated enterprises which form a part of MNE group. To sum up, 
there are both internal and external grounds and reasons for on the set 
up of transfer pricing within the intragroup trade in goods, service, and 
intangibles assets. Followings are the MNEs and tax authority’s view 
on transfer pricing. 
III . MNES’ MOTIVATIONS FOR TRANSFER PRICING
First, the nature of MNEs is an integrated business group which 
consist of associated affiliates in other countries, under common con-
trol, with common goals, and sharing a common pool of resources.6 
Theoretically, MNEs are only subjected to domestic law of the different 
states in which they operate in7, but during transactions, MNEs must 
comply with the different from country to country’s laws & regulations 
and administrative requirements.Many foreign affiliates of MNE are 
run as the profit centres, which the income of the top strata of the MNEs 
5  United Nations Tax’s Committee Working Draft on Transfer Pricing, 6th July 2011; 
Roger Y. W. Tang 1997, Intrafirm Trade and Global Transfer Pricing Regulation, 
Wesport, Quorum Books.
6  Eden, op cit no. 1, p. 596
7  M. Sonarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition), 2010
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depend on their affiliates’ profit.8 In this case, it is internally driven that 
the setting of transfer price within the intra-group transactions is to in-
crease the overall efficiency within the firm and  monitor the perfor-
mance of one’s entity within the MNEs group, especially on determin-
ing the profitability and income of entities involved in the transactions. 
Externally, MNEs’ main purpose on conducting transfer pricing is to 
optimize the tax arrangement9.and minimize the taxes paid. By con-
ducting transfer pricing, MNE as a whole, paid a lower tax rate due to 
the profit shifting in the lower tax jurisdiction and consequently, having 
the tax liability of the relevant company distorted in consequent.10 Also, 
the profit gained by MNE is much higher as the transfer price is depend-
ing on the price at which the intrafirm transaction takes place. However, 
still, they are amounted to double taxation, in which they are obliged 
to pay corporate income taxes for both domestic and foreign source in-
come as they conduct a transfer pricing on the cross-border transaction.
IV . TAX AUTHORITIES/GOVERNMENT’S VIEW ON TRANS-
FER PRICING
Unlike MNEs who view transfer pricing as a media to internally 
monitor their management, meanwhile paying a reduced tax obliga-
tions to the whole of MNEs group, tax authority – in contrast,  are only 
interested in the revenue gained by MNE’s local entity. Thus, the tax 
authority of the involved government has the right to tax the MNE’s 
income within their jurisdiction.11 However, Tax authority sees transfer 
pricing to be unpleasant since the government may lose their fair share 
of tax revenue. This is inevitably due to MNEs are paying less than they 
should be as their supposedly taxable revenue is being disproportion-
ately allocated to the countries with lower tax jurisdiction – in which at 
8  Eden, loc cit no. 3, p. 597
9  Ernst & Young Report on Transfer Pricing, 2013 
10  Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration, 2012, Re-
port of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, p. 7 (‘OECD Transfer Pricing and 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration’)
11  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Adminis-
trations, para 5‐ 12; Wolfgang Schön, “International Tax Coordination for a Second‐
Best World (Part III)”, 2 World Tax Journal (2010), p.227 – 261;
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the end, MNE as a whole, pay less tax than they are supposed to.
V . PROBLEMS GENERATED FROM TRANSFER PRICING MA-
NIPULATION
The transfer pricing itself, is not illegal dan does not bring forth a tax 
avoidance. Only when the price set is not in accordance with interna-
tional applicable norms or domestic law – so called a ‘transfer mispric-
ing’, an issue of tax evasion and profit shifting may arise. In narrower 
aspect of tax administration, the problems on policy and practical level 
may arise. At the policy level, governments can exercise their rights 
to tax the profits of taxpayer based upon the income generated within 
their territory. In practical level, it is difficult for tax administration to 
obtain the detailed and pertinent data from the transactions conducted 
by MNEs located outside their jurisdiction.12 
Although according to the abovementioned explanations transfer 
pricing seem innocuous, transfer pricing is bound to shape the tax base 
of the countries involved in the crossborder transaction, involving the 
MNEs and tax authorities. Transfer pricing is usually conducted and 
manipulated through moving the deductible expenses to the high taxes 
jurisdiction and shifting the revenues to the tax haven countries. Hence, 
without any consistent rules and administration, MNEs might be pro-
vided with an incentive to evade taxation through transfer pricing ma-
nipulation, which is an over or under-invoicing of related party transac-
tions in order to avoid government regulations13; and yet – the world 
of international tax is left to deal with the upcoming legal loopholes, 
mainly concerning the jurisdictional matters, custom valuation, and al-
location of profit.
A. JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
Theoretically, MNEs are only subjected to domestic law of the dif-
ferent states in which they operate in14, but during transactions, MNEs 
must comply with the different from country to country’s laws & regu-
12  OECD
13  Lorraine Eden, 594
14  M. Sonarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third Edition), 2010
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lations and administrative requirements. Differing requirements lead to 
the greater burden on MNE, resulting in higher cost of compliance than 
for a similar enterprise operating solely within the single tax jurisdic-
tions.15 On the other hand, as MNEs are exposed to higher cost compli-
ance to comply with more than one tax jurisdiction, the tax authority 
is also exposed to a similar degreee of problem due to the adjustments 
made to the transfer price in one tax jurisdiction that immediately affect 
the other corresponding jurisdiction.
B. DOUBLE TAXATION 
Double taxation arises when two enterprises, as residents in differ-
ent states, are assessed tax on the same profit or income without relief 
provided by either state for tax imposed by the other. The double taxa-
tion may be a result of non-arm’s length transactions. The profits of one 
enterprise are adjusted upwards (mainly due to underpricing of sales 
and overpricing of transactions), increasing the tax charged on that en-
terprise in one state - known as a primary transfer pricing adjustment, 
without a corresponding reduction in tax payable of the associated en-
terprise in the other state.16 However, problems arise if the other govern-
ments try to reconcile their rights to tax the income within their territory 
as a result of such cross-border transaction and thus, having one trans-
action to be taxed by more than one country’s jurisdiction.This leaves 
the question on who has the right to tax the MNEs’ income, given both 
governments have the same rights and which tax court shall continue 
on with the proceedings in case of dispute. Those issues arise due to 
MNEs being able to avoid the national reach of government regulations 
on transfer pricing – engaging in practice and being equipped with tools 
in order to reduce their overall taxable profit. 
C. ALLOCATION
In most jurisdictions, the tax authority bears the burden of proof 
– requiring them to establish a prima facie evidence, showing that the 
MNE’s pricing is inconsistent with the arms’ length principle. From 
MNE’s perspective, still, these resources shall be allocated where they 
15  OECD Guidelines 2010, Preface, no. 3
16  Inland Revenue Department 
66Volume 14 Number 1 October 2016
Promoting regional integration through higher education
offer an overall advantage for MNE as a while, thus having MNEs mo-
tivated to shift their profits into countries with lower tax jurisdiction. 
Those low tax jurisdictions (i.e tax havens) providee an intriguing of-
fer for MNEs meanwhile creating tax competition between the nation 
states. 
However, national trade and tax barriers impede such allocation and 
also raise the transactional and compliance cost for MNEs. It is also to 
be noted, even though  common resources are a source of competitive 
advantage for members of the MNE, such resources are interdependent 
and thus, making it difficult to disentangle the MNE’s global income 
for tax purpose. 
D. VALUATION (CUSTOM VALUATION)
In practice, MNEs are unconsciously provided with a tool to uti-
lize the intragroup transfer prices for custom purposes. The most sig-
nificant problems arising from this aspects are having to demonstrate 
the intercompany transfer prices to be an acceptable custom value and 
properly account for retroactive transfer pricing adjustment to value for 
customs purpose.17 When goods are sold between related parties, the 
taxable pricing is also used for custom valuation purpose. While trans-
fer pricing is mainly done by underpricing the intra-company sales and 
overpricing company purchase, the underinvoicing of intragroup sales 
is the main tool to reduce the tax cost, there cause no definite value of 
such goods upon the taxable profit. 
VI . ARMS’ LENGTH PRINCIPLE ON TRANSFER PRICING PUR-
POSE
Due to the aforementioned problems concerning transfer pricing, 
government nowadays are facing challenges on protecting their tax ju-
risdiction while not creating double taxation or uncertainties that would 
affect their foreign investment and movement of goods and service. 
Thus, the adoption of transfer pricing framework embodying the arms’ 
17  The Intersection of Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation: Challenges (and op-
portunities) for Multinational Enterprises, Michael E. Murphy and Holly E, Max 
Planck Encyclopediaea of Public International Law, 2009, p. 149
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length principle will be the solution to achive such dual objectives. 
A. THE ARMS’ LENGTH STANDARD
Where transactions in goods and services move between associated 
enterprises across country borders it is necessary for companies to es-
tablish transfer prices with respect to those transactions. However, to 
comply with the prevailing transfer pricing regulations, those prices on 
such transactions must be made on an arms’ length basis.
 Under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, arms’ 
length is defined as a condition made or imposed in the use or transfer 
of intangibles between two associated enterprises differ from those that 
would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, 
but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be includ-
ed in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. In practical 
approach, an entity would only acquire the goods or services from the 
associated enterprises with the purchase price equal to or below than 
the ones offered by the unrelated parties/suppliers. Conversely, the sell-
ing price to the associated enterprises shall be equal to or higher than 
the price paid by the unrelated parties/purchasers. Prices on this matter 
shall gravitate towards the ‘arms’ length principle’ – in which this prin-
ciple requires two related parties to determine their transfer prices for 
an intra-group transaction in which two unrelated parties would have 
agreed with when those unrelated parties engage in similar transaction. 
It will then, to be generally recognized as prices on which two unrelated 
parties would agree to a transaction after bargaining in a competitive 
market. 
Such principle set forth within the transfer pricing regulation as in 
accordance with OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines might bring forth 
several tools for the government to face the transfer pricing challenges 
head on:18
1. Set up the boundaries while providing governments with tools they 
need to fight on the transfer pricing issue conducted by the MNEs
18  OECD – Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Transfer Pricing Legislation – A 
Suggested Approach, June 2011, p. 2
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2. Provide MNE with certainty of treatment in such tax jurisdiction
3. Reduce the double taxation
4. Provide a level playing field between the government (as a result of 
double taxation), thus less likely to hamper the international trade 
and investment
B. TRANSFER PRICING OF THE INTANGIBLES 
In the practical approach, transfer pricing concealed in the cross-
border transactions often constitutes a transfer price on the intangibles. 
What constitues as an intangible is something which is not a physical 
asset or a financial asset, and which is capable of being owned or con-
trolled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would 
be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between independent 
parties in comparable circumstances.19 Intangibles itself, by OECD, is 
being limited to commercial intangibles – intangible property associat-
ed with commercial activities (e.g production of a good or provision of 
service, or even a business asset transferred to customers or used within 
the business operation). The term intangible property ecompasses the 
rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, designs, or 
models, even know-how, and trade secrets.20 
There are two classified types of intangibles:
1. Trade Intangibles (e.g patents, know-how, and technology intangi-
bles created through investments in research and development)
2. Marketing Intangibles (e.g trademark, trade names)
Previously, the arms’ length guidance and transfer pricing method 
shall are generally used to determine the pricing for the tangible proper-
ty. However, as stipulated in the Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects 
of Intangibles, it might be difficult to apply in the case of transactions 
involving intangible property due to the complicated search for com-
parables and the uncertain values at times of transaction.21 Therefore, 
in the amendments of the guidance further elaborate that in order to 
determine the arms’ length condition on the transfer of intangibles, it is 
19  Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 2014, p. 31
20  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, p. 191
21  Ibid, p. 195
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important to take these followings into account22:
1. Identification of specific intangibles
2. Legal ownership of intangiblesIdentifying the legal owner of intan-
gibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements: reg-
istrations, licence agreements, other relevant agreements. Then, the 
consistency between the conduct of the parties and the terms of the 
relevant legal arrangements regarding intangible ownership will be 
examined with a thorough functional analyses. 
3. Contributions MNE group to their development and enhancementI-
dentifying the parties performing functions through assets used and 
risks assumed related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, pro-
tecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional 
analyses.
4. Nature of controlled transactions involving such intangiblesIden-
tifying the controlled transactions related to the development, en-
hancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles 
in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles under relevant reg-
istrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including 
their relevant contributions of functions, assets, risks and other fac-
tors.
5. Remuneration value paid between independent parties involving in-
tangibles (optional)The compensation that must be paid to members 
of the MNE group that contribute to the development, enhancement, 
maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles is generally 
determined on an ex ante basis (anticipated). However, the alloca-
tion of ex post (actual) remuneration will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
a. Who owns the intangibles?
The question on who owns the intangibles has been ringing through 
the practical approach since the old times. The ownership can be cat-
egorized to 2 aspects: legal and economic ownership. The legal owner-
ship is the one that needs to be taken into account, as they can maximize 
their possession on the ownership to manipulate the transfer between 
legal entity. Often, the owner splits their economic and legal ownership 
22  Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 2014, p. 41
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so they can take the benefits on their commercial and tax interest to its 
maximum.
However, the issues will arise if there are 2 or more different entities 
owning the legal or economic ownership – how to split profit among 
those entities claiming on having the legal or economic ownership re-
spectively. 
In this case, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines on Trans-
fer Pricing, the legal owner shall take on the profits. If no legal owner 
of the intangible is identified, the entity – based on facts and circum-
stances, controls decisions concerning the exploitation of such specific 
intangible and has the practical capacity to restrict others from using 
the intangible shall be consider as the legal owner of such intangibles.23 
However, for transfer pricing purposes, for the legal owner to retain the 
derived returns from intangible exploitation – the owner shall perform 
their function, use the relevant assets, assumes no relevant risks regard-
ing the development of intangible. 
b. Determining the Transfer Prices of Intangibles (Case, Veritas 
n GE) Identification of legal ownership, combined with the identifica-
tion and compensation of relevant functions performed, assets used, 
and risks assumed by all contributing members, provides the analytical 
framework for identifying arm’s length prices and other conditions for 
transactions involving intangibles. Such analyses shall consider all of 
the relevant facts and circumstances present in a particular case and 
price determinations must reflect the realistic alternatives of the rel-
evant group member, including the functions performed, assets used, 
and assumed risks. 
C. ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF TRANSFER PRICING
For 20s years, there has been a growing uniformity in the acceptable 
transfer pricing methods applied by the tax authorities in developed 
and emerging market economy. However, transfer pricing is a matter 
of facts and status quo, thus, each countries may have different meth-
od used by their tax authorities. Followings are the acceptable transfer 
23  Op cit, p. 43
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pricing method used and applied by most countries across the globe. 
1. Transactional Methods
Transaction-based method is used to calculate the transfer prices on 
the sales of tangible property (goods). 
a. Product Comparable
Within the product comparable, a Comparable Uncontrolled Price 
(CUP) is often used. To calculate the transfer prices under the CUP, 
the price of transaction between MNE and the unrelated parties for the 
same product under the same circumstances are taken into account. 
Also, they shall consider the characteristic of the product, market loca-
tion, trade level of the firms, and risk involved.24 
b. Functional Comparable (Gross-margin Method)
The functional comparable method is an alternate when a product 
comparable is not available. This method concerns about the one side 
and narrower approach of the transaction, either the manufacturer or 
distributor and to calculate the price using functional approach. Follow-
ings are the two fuctional comparable method (and also considered as 
gross-margin methods) used to determine the transfer prices.
i. Resale Price Method (RPM)
 Under the RPM, the tax authority’s concerns are for the firms at 
the similar trade levels that perform similar distribution fuctions, 
assuming that similar margins on sales are earned for similar 
function. Given a large number of distributors, to calculate an 
average over those unrelated firms can be a comparison for the 
margin that the distribution affiliate will gain in an arms’ length 
transaction (also known as the gross profit margin, since it is 
derived by the gross margins earned by the comparable distribu-
tors engaged in the comparable functions). The formula to de-
termine the transfer price is the overall retail price (price sold to 
the consumer) substracted by the abovementioned margins. This 
method ensures that the buyer receives an arms’ length return 
consistent with those earned by similar firms in a similar trans-
action. 
 However, as RPM method is only one-sided, this method cannot 
24  Eden, p. 605
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precisely calculate whether the manufacturer’s profit is consist-
ent with the margins earned by the other manufacturers. Under 
this method, once the distributor’s margin has been determined, 
all the excess profit on the transaction is automatically assigned 
to the manufacturers. RPM is best used when the distributors 
add relatively little value to the product, making the value of its 
function easier to eastimate and having intangibles less likely to 
be undervalued. 
ii. Cost + Method
 Cost + method calculates that the transfer price can be deter-
mined when the gross markup (assuming that the percentae 
markups over cost that would be earned by other arms’ length 
manufacturers would be roughly the same) charged by the un-
related firms is added to the standard cost of the related party. 
Thus, this method is also a one-sided method, like RPM. As a 
one-sided method, C+ only concerns about the profit markup 
of the seller and insists that the other seller should earn only 
what arms’ length sellers would earn in a similar circumstances. 
This method immediately allocates the profit to the distributor, 
implicitly assuming the supplier is the manufacturers and thus, 
working best when the producer is simple manufacturer with-
out complicated activities, having the cost and return to be more 
easily estimated.25
2. Profit-based method
Previous product comparable methods have proven themselves du-
rable to withstand transfer pricing currents. However, product compa-
rable still could not tackle the remaining problems of the lack of arms’ 
length comparables, making CUP, RPM, and C+ difficult to use in prac-
tical approach, especially in the case of intangibles. This is due to the 
non-existent external market prices. To deal with this problem, transfers 
of intangibles shall be priced commensurate with those intangibles in-
come (CWI Standard). In this CWI standard, the functional analysis and 
contemporary documentation of transfer pricing policies are required. 
Followings are the two profit-based methods added to complement the 
transaction comparable method.
25  Eden, p. 607
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a. Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM)
TNMM is the method commonly used fot justifying the transfer 
pricing of the company. TNMM method compares the net profit margin 
earned by the arms’ length party with the non-arms’ length one s and 
use those net margin to go trace back the transfer price. TNMM search-
es for the comparable transactions and moves up for the other transac-
tions for which datas can be found. In addition, a functional analysis of 
both the associated enterprise and the independent enterprise is required 
to determine if the transactions are comparable. It might of course be 
possible to adjust results for minor functional differences, provided that 
there is sufficient comparability to begin with, The standard of compa-
rability for application of TNMM is no less than that for the application 
of any other transfer pricing method.26
b. Comparable profits method (CPM)
This CPM Method is a profit-based method, where the industry av-
erage net profit margin earned by comparable firms is used to back into 
the transfer price. To perform CPM analysis, the tested party’s (party 
whose operating profit attributable to the transactions require the fewest 
and more reliable adjustment)  results are compared to those of com-
parable parties (unrelated firms engaged in the same business segment 
with their balance sheet adjusted for differences).27 
To determine whether the price falls within the arms’ length range, 
a net profit margin (derived from the profit level indicator – return on 
assets and sales) of the tested party is to be compared with the inter-
quartile range of the comparable parties, having those margin shall fall 
inside the interquartile range. If the company’s net profit margin falls 
outside the range, the tax authority will set the margin at the median 
range and solves backwards to determine the transfer price. The re-
maining profit of the transaction is then is assigned to the comparable 
parties, making the CPM a one-sided method as it focuses only the net 
26  […] Transfer Pricing Methodologies: OCED guidelines: Transactional net margin 
method available at, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm421080.htm, 
accessed 3 September 2015
27  Transfer Pricing Rules and Compliance Handbook, 2006, Marc. M Levey, Steven 
C Wrappe, Kluwer Publishers.
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margins of the tested company.28
VII .SOLUTION: CREATING A REGIONAL TRANSFER PRIC-
ING REGIME
Transfer pricing issue on cross-border transaction, especially within 
the ASEAN Regime, has become difficult to deal with as they involve 
more than one tax jurisdiction. Consequently, any adjustment to the 
transfer price in one tax jurisdiction immediately affect the other corre-
sponding jurisdiction. Problems arise if, the corresponding jurisdiction 
does not agree with such adjustment being made – they will also tax 
the MNE, thus amounting to a double taxation for a similar transaction. 
Thus, to overcome the issues of double taxation, a regional transfer 
pricing regime is required to monitor the flow and tackle upcoming is-
sues of cross-border transaction in ASEAN.
Regional regimes are sets of functional and behavioral relationships 
among national governments that has been established in response to 
particular issues that has risen up to outside one country’s jurisdiction 
– in this case, a transfer pricing. For example, in the situations when 
there are no definite legal framework establishing the transfer pricing 
policy within such regional, there will be incentives for governments or 
MNE to behave opportunistically and thus, setting up a regional regime 
will enhance the global welfare by providing rules of behavior, source 
of information, legal certainty, and formalizing the dispute settlement 
mechanisms; as it embodies principles, norms, rules, and procedures. 
Hence, is needed to manage interdependencies among nations.29
A. TRANSFER PRICING AS STIPULATED UNDER THE REGIME 
OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
Generally, the EU could act as a pattern for ASEAN, primarily on 
the expected ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. While EU coun-
tries have already started to have themselves assembled into a regional 
block with internal market boundary by introducing the freedoms for 
28  Eden, p. 608
29  Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables’ in Stephen Krasner, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983
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goods, service, and capital. These freedoms have impacted the mem-
ber ccountries of EU towards a tremendeous economic growth in all 
regions, despite their economic segregration.30
1. EU Arbitration Convention
In the transfer pricing section, to resolve disputes on transfer pric-
ing which  leads to double taxation, in 1990, EU Tax Committee es-
tablished a legal framework to tackle such upward adjustment of profits 
of an enterprise of one member states – The EU Arbitration Convention 
(“Convention”). This Convention possesses a binding nature towards 
all the contracting states on the  goal of eliminating double taxa-
tion. As a result, this convention has improved the climate of cross-
border transaction within the EU internal market. 
EU Arbitration Convention provides that transactions between af-
filiated companies should be in accordance with the arms’ length stan-
dard. Consequently, the tax authorities of the Member States can adjust 
the profit made from the transactions when it is not at arms’ length. Af-
filiated companies are to be assumed as if they are wholly independent 
from each other. 
EU Arbitration Convention also offers a solution to eliminate the 
classical problems of transfer pricing – double taxation problems. Ac-
cording to the EU Arbitration Convention, one of the parties can request 
a mutual agreement procedure with the tax authorities of the Member 
States if an upward adjustment of profit is being made by an enterprise 
of the Member States.31 Both Member States need to come up with a 
mutual agreement within two years or else an Advisory Commission 
will be established, as stipulated under article 11 of the Convention. 
The Advisory Commission will deliver its opinion within six months. 
After this the Member States can come to a mutual agreement which is 
different from the opinion, but they have to do this within six months. If 
they don’t mutual agree within six months, the opinion of the Advisory 
Commission is binding. In accordance with the provisions set out in the 
Convention, double taxation of profits shall be regarded as eliminated 
if either  the profits are included in the computation of taxable profits 
30  Asean Tax Guide, KPMG Asia Pacific Tax Centre, November 2013,
31  Article 5 of EU Arbitration Convention; Implications of the Arbitration Conven-
tion, 2006, Andreas Bernath, Jonkoping University
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in one State only or the tax chargeable on those profits in one State is 
reduced by an amount equal to the tax chargeable on them in the other.32 
2. EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum
While there is a binding convention, there shall be a jointly authority 
established in order to execute the provisions set out in the Convention. 
In 2002, the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (“JTPF”) – comprised of 
EU member states and business representative (transfer pricing advi-
sors and multinational’s tax expert), was established with the goal of 
eliminating transfer mispricing throughout the EU.33 
The JTPF examined procedural issues related to the improvement of 
the practical functioning of the Convention. This included procedures 
to be followed during the interim period when not all Member States 
had ratified the Prolongation Protocol, the starting point of the three 
year deadline for presentation of a case, the starting point of the two 
year mutual agreement procedure and proceedings during it, the pro-
ceedings during the arbitration phase and the interaction of procedures 
under the Convention with administrative and judicial appeals. The 
JTPF concluded that the optimal way to improve the practical function-
ing of the Convention and to deal with the various issues of it and the 
recommendations for those issues, was to propose a Code of Conduct 
with rules for the effective implementation of the Convention.34 
JTPF also examined existing rules in Member States for suspension 
of tax collection during administrative and judicial appeals. It came to 
the conclusion that in almost all countries this is regulated for domestic 
procedures at legal level. However, for crossborder dispute resolution 
these regulations only exist in few countries although a significant num-
ber of tax administrations could on a discretionary basis suspend the 
tax collection in order to avoid double payment, even if such specific 
regulations do not exist. The absence of rules enabling the suspension 
32  Article 14 of EU Arbitration Convention
33 […], Taxation Customs Index, available at, http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_
customs/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/forum/index_en.htm, .accessed 5th 
September 2015
34  Report of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Report on the activities of the EU 
Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of business taxation October 2002 – Decem-
ber 2003, p. 5-6
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of tax collection during cross-border dispute resolution, at least to the 
same extent as for domestic litigation creates an additional financial 
burden for the enterprises wishing to apply international double taxa-
tion resolution. Therefore, the code provides that Member States are 
recommended to take all necessary steps to ensure that the suspension 
of tax collection is obtainable for enterprises during the procedures of 
the Arbitration Convention in the same way as it would be for domestic 
appeals
B. TRANSFER PRICING: HOW SHOULD IT BE GOVERNED 
WITHIN THE ASEAN REGIME?
With the implementation of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
in December 2015, ASEAN is heading down the path to achieve a fully 
integrated regional regime of economy. AEC provides the opportunity 
to smoothen business operations to take advantages on the new internal 
market within the ASEAN members. The opportunities pivot on the 
actions of the government – ensure the legislation and the general cor-
porate commercial climate is compatible with the expected affluence of 
investment and trade in ASEAN. The pleasant commercial environment 
has been catalysed by the decreased corporate tax rates, witholding tax 
rates, and custom tarrifs; to streamline the movement of goods and cap-
ital and thus, reducing the tax costs and inputs of taxpayers. Though 
each member states have reduced their tax costs and inputs of taxpay-
ers, the tax rates between the ASEAN member countries still remain in-
consistent – they have not been harmonized. This would become a hin-
drance in the upcoming 2015 AEC with a more mobile market where it 
is easier for goods, services, and capital to move across each countries’ 
borders – making a profit shifting by MNEs to the countries with a 
lower corporate income tax inevitable. 
‘
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Countries Transfer Pricing Regime National Legislation on TP
Brunei 
Darussalam Yes. 
There is no formal legislation on Transfer Pricing.
Any intragroup cross-border transactions between the 
residents and foreign entities has to be conducted within the 
arm-length reach.
Cambodia
No. It is only generally 
accepted that any 
intragroup cross-border 
transaction has to be 
within the arm-length 
reach.
No specific national legislation on Transfer Pricing.
The tax authority has the rights to authorize and re-
determine the related party transactions in order to impose 
pricing that arms’ length parties would have contracted for in 
the transactions. 
Indonesia Yes
Directorate General of Tax Regulation No. 32/PJ/2011
The transfer pricing regime is based on OECD Guidelines.
Here, Directorate General of Tax (DGT) has the extended 
authorization from all domestics to cross-border transaction.
Laos No No national legislation concerning Transfer Pricing
Malaysia1 Yes
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2012 (P.U. [A] 132)
The transfer pricing and advanced pricing agreement rules 
were issued in May 2012, but have a retroactive effective 
date of 1 January 2009. The transfer pricing rules make 
it mandatory for taxpayers to prepare contemporaneous 
transfer pricing documentation for their related party 
transactions.
The 2012 Malaysian transfer pricing guidelines are largely 
based on the governing standard for transfer pricing, which 
is the arm’s length principle as established in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD Guidelines).
The IRB accepts CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, Profit Split 
and TNMM. However, the Malaysian transfer pricing rules 
state that the traditional methods are preferred over the 
profit methods and advise that the profit methods should 
only be used when the traditional methods cannot be 
reliably applied or cannot be applied at all.
Myanmar No No formal national legislation concerning Transfer Pricing
Phillippines2 Yes
Revenue Regulations 2-2013, dated 23 January 2013
The regulations mainly follow the provisions stipulated 
under OECD Guidelines.
The tax authority has the power to allocate income between 
the related parties to prevent the tax evasion and transfer 
mispricing. The tax authority is using the arms’-length 
principle on evaluating the cross-border transaction. 
The BIR accepts CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, Profit Split 
and TNMM.
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Singapore3 Yes
Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2006, dated 23 February 2006 – 
issued by Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore
The legislation strongly follows the OECD Guidelines.
Singapore’s tax authority is endorsing the arms’-length 
principle on conducting the review on transfer pricing.
IRAS does not have a specific preference for any of the 
5 methods outlined in the OECD guidelines, method 
that produces the most reliable results shall be selected. 
However, IRAS tends to endorse comparable uncontrolled 
price for the loan transactions. 
Thailand4 Yes
Departmental Instruction no. Paw 113/2545 (DIP 113), 
dated 16 May 2002
It follows the OECD Guidelines on TP.
The Thai Revenue Departmenr (TRD), by default, accepts 
TNMM, although they would also accept CUP, Resale Price, 
Cost + and other commercially used methods, such as the 
Profit Split, as specified in the OECD Guidelines
Vietnam5 Yes
General Department of Taxation, Circular 66/2010/TT/BTC 
jo Decision No. 1250/QD-BTC 
The tax authorities has the authority to adjust the 
transfer price with respect to non arms’ length related 
party transactions and taxpayer to comply with the TP 
requirement.
The regulations are generally based on the OECD 
Guidelines.
Circular 66 permits the use of the following methods: 
CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, TNMM, and Profit Split. 
Taxpayers must use the most appropriate method under 
the regulations. There is no hierarchy among the methods, 
although recent practice shows that the Vietnam tax 
authority has a growing preference for the CUP method.
VIII . CONCLUSION
Having seen the varied income tax rates and numerous transfer pric-
ing regulation in each ASEAN Member states in which such situation 
may offer the increased risk of setting up a non arms’ length trans-
fer price and profit shifting –the author suggests it is advisible to cre-
ate a regional transfer pricing regime within the ASEAN jurisdiction. 
In a nutshell, the transfer pricing regulations shall govern the norms, 
standard, and transfer pricing policies in practical business approach 
while  emphasizing that the transactions between affiliated companies 
should be in accordance with the arms’ length standard. This regulation 
may also adopt acceptable transfer pricing methods as set out in OECD 
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Guidelines on Transfer Pricing, such as methods under transactional 
cost method and profit-based method on determining the transfer prices. 
Moreover, deriving from the practice of European Eunion, an affiliated 
enterprise shall be considered an independent entity while subsidiaries 
still being regarded as parts of MNEs as a whole. 
Furthermore, this regulation will provide ways to eliminate the most 
classical issue of transfer pricing – double taxation. This regulation will 
permit that one of the parties can request a mutual agreement procedure 
with the tax authorities of the Member States if an upward adjustment 
of profit is being made by an enterprise of the Member States. Also, 
double taxation of profits shall be regarded as eliminated if either the 
profits are included in the computation of taxable profits in one State 
only or the tax chargeable on those profits in one State is reduced by an 
amount equal to the tax chargeable on them in the other. 
The author believes that by establishing a regional framework on 
transfer pricing within the ASEAN Regime, the problems arising from 
transfer pricing will be greatly reduced, as such regional framework 
will set up the boundaries while providing governments with tools they 
need to fight on the transfer pricing issue conducted by the MNEs, pro-
vide MNE with certainty of treatment in such tax jurisdiction, and more 
importantly - reduce the double taxation. As double taxation and profit 
shifting problems will be reduced, the flow of capital, goods, and ser-
vice will not be anymore hampered by the international tax problems.
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